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AIR AND NOISE POLLUTION SURROUND-
ING AIRPORTS: EAST HAVEN V. 
EASTERN AIRLINES, INC.t 
By Michael B. Meyer:-
In the last decade, commercial air travel has increased signifi-
cantly, and turbo-prop and jet aircraft have become major com-
mercial air vehicles.2 These developments have caused marked 
increases in air and noise poIlu tion in the vicini ty of airports.3 The 
rights of nearby property holders to a quiet and clean environ-
ment have increasingly come into conflict with whatever rights 
the public has to relatively unrestricted air travel. In East Haven 
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., the United States District Court for the 
District of Connecticut dealt with such a conflict, and ruled for 
the public's right to relatively unrestricted air trave1.4 The court's 
opinion calls attention to the basic legal theories that have rele-
vance to this nationwide environmental problem.6 
Tweed-New Haven Airport, occupying land within the City 
of New Haven and the Town of East Haven, is owned and oper-
ated by the City of New Haven.6 1t is served by two major com-
mercial air carriers, Eastern and Allegheny, which employ turbo-
prop and jet aircraft. 7 Since the airport began in 1931 as a small 
turf runway handling only a few flights, it has expanded several 
times. 8 Today it is a technologically advanced, metropolitan jet 
airport, with the paved runways of 4,100 and 5,600 feet. 9 Flight 
operations are conducted in compliance with regulations promul-
gated by the Federal Aviation Administration (hereinafter the 
FAA).lO 
In 1967, the Town of East Haven and individual property 
holders therein sued the City of New Haven, Eastern and Alle-
gheny Airlines, and the Administrator of the FAA, for legal and 
equitable reliefY All plaintiffs sought an injunction against con-
tinued operations at the airport as well as damages for reduced 
property values.12 Individual property holders additionally 
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sought "emotional damages" as compensation for the annoyance 
and inconvenience caused by the airport operations.13 In January 
1968, the court ruled upon all defendants' motions to dismiss.a 
The suit against the Administrator of the FAA was dismissed for 
lack of in personam jurisdiction, for improper venue, and for fail-
ure to allege facts upon which relief might be granted.16 The other 
defendants' motions to dismiss, however, were denied.16 
In July 1971, after a non-jury trial, the court held: first, plain-
tiffs could not obtain an injunction on a nuisance or trespass 
theory against further operations at the airport; second, plain-
tiffs could not recover against the airlines for air and noise pollu-
tion on a partial compensable taking theory; third, plaintiffs 
could not recover against the operator of the airport (here" the 
City of New Haven) on a partial compensable taking theory for 
infrequent flights directly over property, for frequent flights not 
directly over property, or for adjacent ground operations, but 
plaintiffs could recover against the airport operator on a partial 
compensable taking theory for the effects of frequent flights 
directly over property; and fourth, individual property holders 
who had recovered on a partial compensable taking theory could 
not also recover for resultant "emotional damages" or mental 
suffering.17 
The court's decision is subject to three major criticisms. Most 
importantly, it does not recognize nuisance as the legal theory 
most applicable to complex controversies involving airports. In 
addition, it does not recognize trespass as an appropriate legal 
theory for dealing with invasions of property by either aircraft 
or physical agents (e.g., soot, gases, energy in the form of shock 
waves, vibrations, or noise). Finally, because of its exclusive 
reliance on a partial compensable taking theory as the basis of 
plaintiffs' recovery, and because of its employment of a strict 
definition of property rights, the court's decision limits the class 
of property holders who may recover; use of this theory also pre-
cludes injunctive relief, the most effective remedy in this regard, 
while allowing only for money damages, an inadequate remedy 
in view of the continuing nature of the problem. 
This article will analyze each of the above three criticisms. 
Additionally, consideration will be given to the procedural issues 
that led to the dismissal of the suit against the Administrator of 
the FAA. Brief mention will also be made of salient provisions of 
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969. 
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NUISANCE 
It is submitted that nuisance is the legal theory most relevant 
to complicated controversies involving airports and their atten-
dant pollution. Extending tort liability to a wide range of con-
duct, nuisance may be of two kinds: private nuisance, which 
involves an unreasonable interference with a private party's 
enjoyment or use of his land, and is remedied through litigation 
by the affected party; and public nuisance, which involves a 
broad interference with a variety of public rights, and is reme-
died through litigation by governmental authoritiesY 
A private nuisance may be shown to exist if: (1) an intentional 
or negligent unreasonable interference with plaintiff's interest in 
land occurs, or if conduct exists which is abnormal or out of place 
with respect to the prevailing use of the surrounding neighbor-
hood; and (2) this invasion or abnormal land use substantially 
interferes with the plaintiff's use or enjoyment of his interest in 
landY Examples of invasions of interests in land that substan-
tially interfere with the landholder's use and enjoyment thereof, 
include: odors,20 smoke or gas,21 noises,22 bright lights,23 and vibra-
tions.24 Injunctive relief may lie where a private nuisance exists 
or is imminent.25 Money damages are also available.26 
In light of the facts in East Haven, private nuisance would seem 
to have provided an appropriate theory for plaintiffs' relief. The 
East Haven court accepted testimony, from plaintiffs whom the 
court characterized as "truthful witnesses,"27 to the effect that 
the use and enjoyment of their respective landholdings had been 
disturbed for an extensive period of time by fumes, soot, noise, 
smoke, smells, vibrations, and bright lights at night.28 These 
physical annoyances had had such diverse harmful effects as 
breaking windows, dirtying house exteriors, shaking pictures off 
walls, loosening fuses in fuse boxes, loosening electrical connec-
tions, restricting the use of outdoor areas, causing fear of crashes 
(the evidence showed that there had been three aircraft crashes, 
of unspecified size and damages, in the area in recent years), and 
making conversation in homes difficult.29 Thus an invasion of 
plaintiffs' interest in land had occurred, and this invasion sub-
stantially interfered with their use and enjoyment in the land.30 
Whether this invasion was intentional or negligent would not 
have been determinative of liability, as nuisance would allow 
recovery in ei ther even t. 31 
Courts have held the private nuisance doctrine to be applicable 
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to such environmental irritants as dust and smoke. For example, 
in 1917, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Tate v. Mull32 that 
the great quantity of dust expelled from a cotton ginnery consti-
tuted a nuisance to an adjacent proprietor and thus justified the 
issuance of an injunction. In Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry 
Company,33 the same court two years later held that smoke alone 
could constitute a nuisance, if plaintiffs could show actual, 
tangible, and substantial injury to property, or palpable inter-
ference with the use or enjoyment of the land by people of ordi-
nary sensi tivi ties. 
More recently, courts have specifically held that the very 
operation of an airport could constitute a nuisance.34 In Anderson 
v. Souza,35 the California Supreme Court in 1952 held that a small, 
private airport's operations constituted a nuisance by reason of 
the erratic and low flying aircraft it brought to the area. It fur-
ther held that an injunction was justified, if conditionally limited 
so as to allow renewed operation of the airport when the com-
plained-of conditions were remedied. Dealing with a large, inter-
national airport in City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines,36 the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey stated in 
1958 that aircraft operations could constitute a private nuisance 
and that an injunction might lie if the aircraft in question flew in 
such a manner as to invade the immediate reaches of any specific 
lands; however, the court, saying that this evidentiary burden 
had not been met by plaintiffs, refused to issue an injunction. 
Although the above cases apply the private nuisance doctrine 
to problems that seem endemic to airports-noise, dust, fumes, 
smoke-they do not represent the majority view in the United 
States. More typical is the 1967 decision by the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York in American 
Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead,37 wherein the court flatly 
rejected the applicability of the private nuisance doctrine. This 
case arose from Hempstead's attempt to impose a noise control 
ordinance on aircraft operations at Kennedy Airport; it was held 
that the ordinance conflicted with flight patterns established 
by the FAA. It is ironic that most of the cases applying the 
private nuisance doctrine deal with the operations of small air-
ports during the 1930's, 40's, and early 50's. One might expect 
that the more distressing effects of a larger, public airport of the 
1960's or 70's would provide enormously greater justification for 
the application of private nuisance. 
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The East Hauen court, nevertheless, rejected the applicability 
of this doctrine as a basis of recovery.3S It found an overriding 
public interest in keeping the airport fully operative and in not 
restricting air trave1.39 The court concluded that many more 
people would be adversely affected by closing a busy airport than 
by continuing the flights.40 The court in effect applied a balancing 
test in which the public interest in relatively unrestricted air 
travel was weighed against the private interest in a relatively 
undisturbed environment,4l With respect to any such balancing 
test, however, it is submitted that the sum of all private interests 
in undisturbed local environments, including those near airports, 
amounts to a public interest. And it is this public interest which 
should be weighed against the other public interest of relatively 
unrestricted air travel. Otherwise a species of tax or charge is un-
fairly imposed upon property holders adjacent to airports: they 
are required to bear the full costs of air transport in terms of 
their own inconvenience and diminished property values. These 
social costs would more properly be borne by the users of airport 
facilities. It should be noted that judicial acceptance of the sug-
gested approach would be tantamount to recognition of private 
litigants as "private attorneys general," suing for the public 
interest on a priuate nuisance theory. Although the traditional 
meaning of private nuisance might thereby be modified, this fact 
should not deter a court from adopting the suggested approach 
in order to assure substantial justice. 
Another means by which individuals may have redress is 
through the concept of public nuisance. Here, the state, repre-
senting its citizens, is plaintiff with respect to negligent or inten-
tional invasions or abnormal land uses, any of which interferes 
with public rights. Such interference was revealed by the evidence 
in East Hauen.42 However, although the elements of public nui-
sance were present, the State of Connecticut simply did not liti-
gate. Nevertheless, as to future airport controversies, it should 
be noted that public nuisance may present a viable theory for 
relief. 
TRESPASS 
Trepass is another theory that should have been applied in 
East Haven. At early common law, there were two requirements 
for proving a cause of action in trespass to land: (1) the mere 
possession of land by a particular person, and (2) the unauthorized 
entry or invasion thereon by another.43 The defendant in a tres-
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pass action was held strictly liable for all damages resulting from 
his trespass, not merely for those damages which were the reason-
ably foreseeable results of his acts.44 The defendant's liability 
existed so long as he had committed some voluntary act that led 
to the trespass; the trespass itself might have been neither inten-
tional nor negligent but could still have been basis for the defen-
dant's liability.45 This rule has been modified, however, through-
out much of the United States today so that the acts must be 
either intentional or negligent or be the result of some extra-
hazardous conduct.46 
Historically, the common law held that an estate extended 
upwards to infinity or "heaven."47 Modern courts, however, in 
an age of air travel and satellites, have understandably restricted 
this doctrine of infinite upper extent of estates in land. The 
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Causby 48 in 1946 
and in Griggs v. Allegheny County 49 in 1962 concluded that a 
Congressional intent had been shown through various legislation50 
to regard airspace above a certain altitude as being in the public 
domain so that private property rights were non-existent above 
this altitude. Under this concept, no trespasses could occur by 
the flight of aircraft above this altitude, no matter how harmful 
the impact on the land belowY However, flights below this level 
might constitute the physical act necessary for a trespass, even 
though they might be on glide or flight paths approved by the 
Civil Aeronautics Authority.52 
The effects of Causby and Griggs have been far-reaching. Modi-
fying early common law, the Restatement, Second, Torts, specifi-
cally takes the Causby rule into consideration by limiting trespass 
flights to those flights within the "immediate reaches of air-
space next to the land."53 It should be noted, however, that 
Causby and the Restatement so further modify traditional tres-
pass doctrine as to make it virtually synonymous with nuisance 
in cases involving repetitive direct overflights of aircraft. Again 
following Causby, the Restatement also limits trespass flights to 
those flights which interfere "substantially with the [plaintiff's] 
use and enjoyment of his land."54 This second restriction upon 
traditional trespass is unfortunate, since it imposes upon the 
plaintiff a considerably heavier burden than would have been 
imposed by earlier doctrine. It is to be emphasized, however, that 
these modifications apply only to aircraft overflights; they do not 
extend beyond this con text. 66 
Applying the Causby modifications to the common law rule, 
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courts have on occasion held aircraft overflights to be trespasses. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in Brandes v. Mitterlint6 in 1948 
stated: 
There is no definite yardstick that may be used in determining how 
low an airplane may fly over the property of others in landing or 
taking off; however, flying at low altitudes incident to landing and 
taking off may constitute trespass, as it may cause more than mere 
apprehension of injury. 
The Brandes court, recognizing a trespass, upheld an injunction 
against flights of this character. However, the injunction was 
issued not because of the acknowledged trespass but primarily 
because of a proven nuisance. Four years later, in Anderson v. 
Souza,57 the California Supreme Court, quoting Brandes with 
approval on the issue of trespass, held that an injunction was 
justified. But here again the court also found that a nuisance 
existed which justified the injunction. Although Brandes and 
Souza do not reflect the majority rule on trespass in the United 
States today, they illustrate the potential for applying trespass 
law to aircraft operations, or at least to direct overflights, in the 
post-Causby era. 
The reasoning behind the East Haven court's refusal to allow a 
remedy for trespass is suspect. Having found that some of the 
plaintiffs might recover for a partial taking, the court stated that 
a decision allowing recovery for trespass would lead to a "double 
recovery," i.e., two different recoveries for the same offensive 
overflights :58 
Where there has been such an invasion in this case by a substantial 
number of overflights I have found the property owner to be en-
titled to recover from the City compensation for that taking. The 
taking includes the trespass. To allow recovery from the City of 
additional damages for the trespass would permit a double recovery 
for the same wrong. Where there has been no taking because there 
has been no significant invasion of plaintiff's property, it would seem 
to follow, at least as far as the City is concerned, that there has been 
no trespass on the property.59 
The court had previously stated that only frequent and direct 
overflights would satisfy the requirements for a taking. 60 How-
ever, it does not necessarily follow that merely because there 
have not been the frequent and direct overflights needed for a 
taking there could not then have been a trespass. This reasoning 
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is further flawed because not all plaintiffs had recovered for a 
taking in the first place and because some of those not so recover-
ing had made out cases in trespass.61 Those who had established 
a trespass and who were denied recovery for a taking would thus 
fall outside the court's "double recovery" argument. The sole 
recovery for these plaintiffs would have been for trespass. No 
convincing reason was given in explanation of why the court 
approached the problem as it did. It is at least as logical to inquire 
first whether there has been a trespass, and then secondly whether 
there has been a taking. This approach would seem especially 
logical in view of the court's theory that repetitive trespass may 
amount to a taking. Further, as injunctive relief lies in the event 
of trespass, but not in the event of partial compensable taking, it 
is unfortunate that the existence of trespass, which permits in-
junctive relief preferable to plaintiffs, depend upon the absence 
of a taking, which entails only money damages. 
The above discussion has dealt only with trespass resulting 
from the physical intrusions of the aircraft per se. However, in 
addition to aircraft overflights, plaintiffs testified that the opera-
tions of the aircraft caused soot, gases, fumes and noise to invade 
their respective properties. As mentioned above, the resulting 
physical damages included: dirtying of house exteriors, breaking 
of windows, shaking of pictures from walls, and loosening of fuses 
and other electrical connections.62 More personal damages in-
cluded: fear of crashes, restrictions on use of outdoor areas, and 
rendering difficult conversations in homes.63 The common law of 
trespass to land extends liability to defendants who directly 
cause physical objects, such as rocks64 or trees,65 to fall upon the 
plaintiff's land. It would not seem unreasonable then to regard 
physical particles (soot), molecules (gases and fumes), or energy 
(noise, vibrations, shock waves) as having the same capacity as 
rocks and trees to effect a trespass. Although in the past, courts 
were reluctant to find a trespass where the physical agent was 
invisible,66 courts in more recent years have found gas,67 dust,68 
gases and particulates,69 and sparks70 to be physical entities suffi-
cient to produce a trespass. The physical agents referred to by 
plaintiffs in East Haven were shown to have been set in motion 
by the airline defendants,71 and to have caused harmful impact 
on plaintiff's property.72 This would seem to compel the conclu-
sion, contrary to that of the court, that liability in trespass had 
indeed been established against the airline-defend an ts. 
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PARTIAL COMPENSABLE TAKING 
The East Haven court regarded a partial compensable taking 
theory as the only basis for plaintiffs recovery. The tradi-
tional theory allows for recovery where the government, in an 
exercise of its eminent domain powers, has acted in such a way as 
to partially take plaintiff's land; the most common example is the 
taking of an easement. From a plaintiff's viewpoint, however, the 
theory suffers from two limitations: (1) strict definitions of prop-
erty rights, and (2) limited forms of relief. The East Haven court 
adopted the view that frequent, direct overflights were needed to 
establish a partial taking. 73 In doing so the court adhered to the 
older, majority view in the United States. The United States 
Supreme Court in Causby held that the United States had im-
posed a servitude on the land of plaintiffs therein by allowing a 
federal agency (the military) to fly frequently and directly over 
plain tiff's land in such a manner as to damage his poultry busi-
ness. 74 As indicated above, the Causby court stated that flights 
that were above a minimum altitude prescribed as safe by the 
(then) Civil Aeronautics Authority were flights in the public 
domain. 75 Flights below this minimum level were expressly held 
not to reach the public domain, even if they were on flight paths 
approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.76 Therefore, the 
court held, flights directly over private land, so low and frequent 
to have been a direct and immediate interference with the use 
and enjoyment of the land, constituted an appropriation of that 
land. 77 
The United States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Allegheny 
County in 1962 applied the Causby standards to a county owned 
and operated airport. 78 The Griggs court held that if the location 
of defendant's airport and the rules of the Civil Aeronautics 
Authority required aircraft to fly regularly over plaintiff's prop-
erty, and if the resultant noise, vibrations, and danger forced the 
plaintiff to move to another location, then an air easement 
(i.e. a partial taking) occurred and plaintiff, under the Four-
teenth Amendment, was entitled to compensation. The Causby 
and Griggs requirement of regular and frequent direct overflights 
has remained essentially unmodified as the majority view in the 
United States.79 
A reasonable basis for a variation upon this standard was 
implied, however, by the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Michigan in 1956 in United States v. Certain 
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Parcels oj Land in Kent County, Michigan. 80 This case held that 
if a source of noise and disturbance (here, a highway) was suffi-
cient to destroy the current use of the adjacent property, there 
occurred thereby a compensable taking; this taking would occur 
despite the fact that the source of the disturbance was beside, 
not above, the land. Air or noise pollution originating from a 
highway or other adjacent activity would ordinarily come from 
a horizontal direction. An extension of this holding to situations 
of aircraft by-flights (diagonal to plaintiff's property) and gen-
eral airport operations (horizontal thereto) would be logical. 
The criterion for a taking should be the effect or impact upon 
the plaintiff's land, not the direction from which the taking was 
effected. Following this logic, the Oregon Supreme Court in 
7 hornburg v. Port of Portland81 in 1962 held that aircraft by-flights 
could constitute a taking; the objectionable flights could be over 
nearby land, as long as there could be shown substantial inter-
ference with the plaintiff's use or enjoyment of his own land. 
This decision looked to the effect of the disturbance, under a 
"substantial interference" test, and did not concern itself with 
the older requirement that the disturbance's origin be directly 
overhead. Taking an even more liberal approach, the Washington 
Supreme Court, in Martin v. Port oj Seattle,82 in 1965 further re-
duced the requirements for a taking by awarding damages not 
only in the absence of direct overflights, but also in the absence 
of a showing of substantial interference with the use of the 
plaintiff's land. If, however, no substantial interference were 
shown, the damages were to be limited to whatever decrease in 
the land's market value could be attributed to the indirect over-
flights. 
Under the partial compensable taking theory injunctive relief 
is usually not available. 83 A taking is considered to be a species of 
legalized trespass by the govern men t. As an exercise of the 
government's right of eminent domain, it is, with respect to 
another party's land, an irreversible assertion of an easement or 
other right for the benefit of the public. Monetary compensation 
is the normal relief for such a taking. 84 If injunctions are granted, 
they are granted only as a matter of judicial grace, and not as a 
matter of right. 85 Generally, injunctive relief will not be applied 
against the government, unless, in addition to irreparable injury 
to the plaintiffs and inadequate remedies at law, the government's 
action is shown to be abusive of its discretion, fraudulent, or in 
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some other manner grossly improper. In the ordinary aircraft 
overflight case, however, where money compensation is usually 
available and where such factors as fraud, gross impropriety or 
abuse of discretion do not exist, injunctions cannot be obtained. 
Since plaintiffs in such litigation will normally desire injunctive 
relief, in the form of cessation or abatement, more than they will 
desire money damages, the partial compensable taking theory 
offers them little promise. 
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Procedural Matters: Dismissal oj the Suit Against 
the Administrator oj the FAA. 
Proceedings against the (national) Administrator of the FAA 
were dismissed on the grounds of improper venue, lack of in 
personam jurisdiction, and failure to allege facts upon which relief 
might be grantedY 
To overcome such venue problems in the future, it may be 
argued that the following federal venue statute (28 U.S.c. 
§1391(e)) applies: 
A Civil Action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of 
the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity 
or under color of legal authority or any agency, of the United States, 
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judi-
cial district in which: (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) 
the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property in the action is 
situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in 
the action .... 88 (Emphasis added). 
Thus with respect to the Tweed-New Haven Airport, a separate 
suit (brought in either Connecticut or the District of Columbia) 
in which the Administrator of the FAA would have been the sole 
defendant, would have satisfied venue requirements. 89 Moreover, 
had §1391(e) been used as the basis for venue, the general pro-
visions of §1391 would have allowed for interstate service of 
process, thus enabling the court to gain in personam jurisdiction 
over the Administrator. 90 The East Haven court stated that had 
there not also been a problem with respect to plaintiff's failure to 
state a claim upon which relief might be granted, the court would 
have ordered a severance, in order to allow the provisions of 
§1391(e) to operate against the Administrator so as to deny his 
motion to dismiss the complaint.9! 
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As to the failure to state a claim, plaintiffs had sought relief in 
the nature of mandamus in order to compel the Administrator to 
order the other defendants to desist from pollution activities. 92 
The Federal Aviation Act of 195893 permits one who seeks en-
forcement of existing regulations or laws to file a written com-
plaint with the Administrator;94 an unfavorable administrative 
decision on this complaint may be appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 95 How-
ever, the only sanction that a United States District Court may 
impose upon the Administrator is to compel him to rule upon a 
WrItten complaint that had been received but not yet acted 
upon. 96 The court in East Haven did not make a finding as to 
whether such a written complaint had been presented to the 
Administrator, but merely noted that much had been said on 
both sides of this issue. 97 As to future controversies, however, 
litigants should be sure to submit administrative complaints to 
the Administrator in order to establish a basis for any subsequent 
legal action against him. 
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 
The FAA, by reason of its legislative mandate,98 must issue 
administrative regulations concerning such matters as the control 
over air commerce, navigable airspace, and air traffic control. 99 
More specific regulatory controls involve take-off and landing 
glide paths, required aircraft equipment, and noise levels. loo The 
Federal Aviation Act itself does not specifically require the 
BoardlOl or the Administratorl02 to consider environmental factors 
in making or enforcing agency regulations. However, the N a-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969103 creates an affirmative 
duty in all U.S. public officials to administer all laws and regula-
tions in such a way as to further the continuing policies of en-
vironmental protection and improvement. l04 Future plaintiffs 
may base administrative complaints to the Administrator of the 
FAA on the failure of the FAA to conform with these policies. lo5 
CONCLUSION 
East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. is representative of the 
majority view in the United States today in its refusal to apply 
nuisance or trespass to airport pollution, and in its allowance of 
only limited damages under partial compensable taking. How-
ever, if the continuing problem of serious airport pollution is to 
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be resolved without legislation, courts in future controversies will 
have to apply, in a more imaginative and vigorous manner, the 
established common law theories. Courts may consider as a 
nuisance the air and noise pollution attendant to running a 
modern airport. They may also apply trespass to instances of 
objectionable overflights or to instances of pollution from noise, 
energy, soot, or gases. When nuisance or trespass is found to 
exist, courts may find that injunctive relief is justified. Addi-
tionally, courts may hold that overflights constitute a partial 
compensable taking, whether or not they occur directly overhead, 
and that full damages should be awarded in compensation there-
for. In this regard, the Thornburg and Martin decisions, by not 
requiring direct overflights for a partial taking, signal a more 
liberal judicial trend. 
Procedural difficulties, such as encountered by plaintiffs in 
East Haven in the dismissal of the suit against the Administrator 
of the FAA, can be avoided by a prior administrative complaint 
and a subsequent separate suit under 28 U.S.c. §1391(e). Sub-
stantively, apart from the above common law theories, the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 may provide a basis for relief when 
it is interpreted in light of the broad mandates of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 
These relevant statutes aside, however, the common law can 
provide substantial relief. Airport pollution continues, not for the 
want of legal theories for damages or abatement, but for the 
want of judicial willingness to apply such historic theories to 
jet-age problems. . ... _>-.-<_.-
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62 I d. at 263-264. 
63 RESTATEMENT, 20, TORTS, §159, provides: 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a trespass may be committed on, 
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90 28 U.S.C. §1391. 
91 Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., supra note 14, at 
511-512. 
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94 49 U.S.C. §1482(a). 
95Id. at §1486(a). 
96 28 U.S.C. §1361; Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 
supra note 14, at 512. 
97 Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., supra note 14, at 
512. 
98 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.c. §1301 et seq. 
99 I d. at §1303. 
100Id. at §§91, 93, 95, 97, 99 (take-off and landing glide paths); 
§§21, 23, 25, 27, 33, 35 (required aircraft equipment); §36 (noise 
levels). Authority for the issuance of these regulations is specifically 
given in Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.c. §§1341, 1343, 1346, 
1348-1350, 1353-1354, 1421-1430. 
101 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.c. §1302. 
102 Id. at §1303. 
103 42 U.S.c. §§4331(a), 4332(1). 
104 Id. at §4332; Donovan, The Federal Government and Environmental 
Control: Administrative Reform on the Executive Level, 1 ENVIRON-
MENTAL AFFAIRS 299 (1971). 
Case law interpreting the mandates of the NEPA is still scarce. State 
Committee to Stop Sanguine v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 664 (W. D. Wis., 
1970), held, while dismissing plaintiffs' complaint, that sufficient facts 
had not been alleged to state a claim upon which relief might be 
granted. Plaintiffs were attempting to block the operation and main-
tenance of a Defense Department radio communication system in 
Wisconsin. The court held that plaintiffs would have to allege that the 
"world wide and long range character of environmental problems" were 
being ignored or not recognized by the defendants in their (defendants') 
proposed course of action, or that appropriate support was not being 
lent to programs "designed to maximize international cooperation." 
These criteria the court chose to apply are taken from 28 U.S.C. 
§4332(E), one of the NEPA's provisions, which is only one of a series 
of apparently independent responsibilities enumerated in that section. 
As other responsibilities also are enumerated, as for example §4332(A) 
and (B), quoted above, it would seem harsh to require an allegation, 
and subsequent proof, of the criteria of §4332(E), which would seem to 
be much harder to prove. It would seem that an allegation of a violation 
of anyone or more of the responsibilities enumerated in §4332 would 
suffice to state a cause of action; it does not seem logical that it be 
necessary to allege a violation of anyone specific responsibility. 
Other cases have accepted much less sweeping allegations as being 
sufficient. State of Delaware v. Pennsylvania N ew York Central Trans-
portation Co., 323 F. Supp. 487 (D. Del., 1971), held that plaintiffs' 
allegations, that the granting of a permit to defendants to construct a 
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dike and fill in a portion of a river would have adverse effects on the 
ecology of the area, that it would block a navigable stream, that it 
would obstruct alleged public rights in easements, and that it would 
land unusable for presently planned projects, were sufficient to state a 
cause of action. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engi-
neers of United States Army, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D. D.C., 1971), held, 
while granting a preliminary injunction against defendants, that plain-
tiffs' allegations of damage to the ecosystem and contamination to the 
water supply resulting from defendants' further construction of a canal 
showed a strong possibility of irreparable damage. The allegations 
stated a cause of action, defendants' motion to dismiss was denied, and 
the preliminary injunction was warranted pending further proceedings. 
Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D. D.C., 1970), granted 
a preliminary injunction to plaintiffs against defendants' further con-
struction of a trans-Alaska pipeline; sufficient allegations were made to 
show the possibility of irreparable damage. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 
199 (5th Cir., 1970), held, reversing summary judgment for plaintiffs 
below that the Army would refuse to issue a permit to dredge and fill 
in navigable waters on environmental grounds even though no naviga-
tion, flood control or power production loss was at issue. See also Penn-
sylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 
(M. D. Pa., 1970); Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E. D. Va., 1971); 
Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska, 1971); National 
Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan., 1971). 
It would seem that plaintiffs in East Haven could satisfy the more 
liberal requirements for stating a cause of action found in Pennsylvania 
New York Central, Environmental Defense Fund, Wilderness Society, 
and Zabel, in a suit against the Administrator of the FAA to force com-
pliance with the NEPA. Allegations of substantial adverse environ-
mental effects of the airports, supported by the evidence admitted in 
East Haven, would seem to be sufficient to state a cause of action. 
106 Id. at §§4321, 4331, 4332. The Department of Transportation Act, 
49 U.S.C. §1651 et seq., included the FAA under the overall responsi-
bility of the Department of Transportation (49 U.S.C. §1652(e) (1)). 
The statement of Congressional purpose of that act stated (49 U.S.C. 
§1651(b)(2)) : 
"It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be 
made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and 
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites." 
